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THE	ORGANIZATION	FOR	ECONOMIC	COOPERATION	AND	
DEVELOPMENT’S	ROLE	IN	INTERNATIONAL	LAW†	
JAMES	SALZMAN	
When	one	 thinks	 of	 international	 organizations	 and	 lawmaking,	
the	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co‐operation	 and	 Development	
(OECD)	rarely	merits	a	mention.		It	certainly	pales	in	comparison	to	
bodies	in	the	U.N.	system:	the	International	Labor	Organization,	and	
the	World	Trade	Organization	 (WTO).	 	 For	 its	 first	 fifty	 years,	 the	
OECD	 has	 remained	 a	 remarkably	 low‐profile	 institution.	 	 Even	
among	 international	 lawyers,	 few	 know	 what	 the	 organization	
really	does.		Even	those	who	know	of	the	OECD	tend	to	focus	on	its	
well‐known	 activities	 in	 economic	 spheres,	 rarely	 thinking	 of	 its	
role	 in	 relation	 to	 social	 or	 environmental	 issues.1	 	 As	 a	 result,	 it	
should	 come	 as	 no	 surprise	 that	 there	 has	 been	 little	 political	
science	 or	 legal	 scholarship	 on	 the	 OECD	 as	 an	 institution	 in	 any	
context.	
This	 issue	 of	 The	 George	Washington	 International	 Law	 Review	
	
†		 This	 Article	was	 given	 as	 a	 presentation	 at	 the	 Spring	 2011	 Symposium	Toward	
Coherence	 in	International	Economic	Law:	Perspectives	at	the	50th	Anniversary	of	the	OECD	
hosted	 by	The	George	Washington	 International	Law	Review.	 	 Substantial	 portions	 of	 this	
Article	are	taken	from	James	Salzman	and	Julio	Bacio	Terracino,	Labor	Rights,	Globalization	
and	 Institutions:	The	Role	and	 Influence	of	 the	Organisation	 for	Economic	Cooperation	and	
Development,	in	SOCIAL	ISSUES,	GLOBALISATION,	AND	INTERNATIONAL	INSTITUTIONS	311	(Virginia	
A.	Leary	and	Daniel	Warner	eds.,	2005)	and	reprinted	here	with	permission	of	Koninklijke	
Brill	NV.		
		 Professor	 of	 Law,	 Duke	 Law	 School;	 M.Sc.	 1990,	 Engineering	 Sciences,	 Harvard	
University;	 J.D.	 1989,	 Harvard	 University;	 B.A.	 1985,	 Yale	 University.	 	 Professor	 Salzman	
worked	for	the	Environment	Directorate	of	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co‐operation	and	
Development	(OECD)	from	1990–1992.		This	Article	is	drawn	from	his	experiences	there	as	
well	 as	 two	 previous	 pieces	 he	 has	 written	 on	 the	 OECD.	 	 See	 generally	 James	 Salzman,	
Decentralized	 Administrative	 Law	 in	 the	 Organization	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	
Development,	LAW	&	CONTEMP.	PROBS.,	Summer–Autumn	2005,	at	189;	James	Salzman,	Labor	
Rights,	 Globalization	 and	 Institutions:	 The	 Role	 and	 Influence	 of	 the	 Organization	 for	
Economic	Cooperation	and	Development,	21	MICH.	J.	INT’L	L.	769	(2000).	
	 1.	 See	generally,	e.g.,	Andrew	Moravcsik,	Disciplining	Trade	Finance:	The	OECD	Export	
Credit	 Arrangement,	 43	 INT’L	 ORG.	 173	 (1989).	 	 This	 study	 of	 the	 OECD	 Export	 Credit	
Arrangement	provides	an	excellent	analysis	of	negotiations	conducted	at	the	OECD,	but	the	
focus	is	on	regime	formation	and	maintenance	rather	than	on	the	OECD	itself.		See	generally	
id.	
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focusing	on	 the	OECD	 is	 therefore	 long	overdue,	 for	 the	OECD	has	
played,	 and	 continues	 to	 play,	 an	 important	 and	 largely	
unrecognized	 role	 as	 a	 lawmaking	 body.	 	 Professor	 Anne‐Marie	
Slaughter,	 for	example,	has	predicted	 that,	 in	 stark	contrast	 to	 the	
United	Nations,	 “[t]he	next	generation	of	 international	 institutions	
is	 .	.	.	 likely	 to	 look	more	 like	 the	Basle	 Committee	 [,	 composed	of	
twelve	central	bank	governors],	or,	more	formally,	the	Organization	
for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development,	dedicated	to	providing	
a	forum	for	transnational	problem‐solving	and	the	harmonization	of	
national	law.”2	
The	 OECD	 occupies	 a	 unique	 space	 in	 the	 international	
lawmaking	 field,	 in	 large	part	 because	 it	was	not	 established	with	
lawmaking	 as	 a	 priority.	 	 First	 established	 to	 administer	 the	
Marshall	 Fund	 for	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 Europe,	 the	 OECD’s	
founding	 treaty	 mandated	 the	 organization	 to	 promote	 policies	
designed:	
(a)	 to	 achieve	 the	 highest	 sustainable	 economic	 growth	 and	
employment	and	a	rising	standard	of	living	in	Member	countries,	
while	 maintaining	 financial	 stability,	 and	 thus	 to	 contribute	 to	
the	development	of	the	world	economy;	
(b)	 to	 contribute	 to	 sound	 economic	 expansion	 in	 Member	 as	
well	 as	 non‐Member	 countries	 in	 the	 process	 of	 economic	
development;	and	
(c)	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 world	 trade	 on	 a	
multilateral,	 non‐discriminatory	 basis	 in	 accordance	 with	
international	obligations.3	
Its	 primary	 purpose	 was	 economic	 rather	 than	 legislative.	 	 To	
that	end,	the	OECD	plays	a	range	of	roles.	
First	 and	 foremost,	 the	 OECD	 is	 a	 research	 and	 networking	
organization.	 	By	virtue	of	 its	 restricted	membership,	 the	OECD	 in	
many	 respects	 acts	 as	 an	 exclusive	 club	whose	members	 produce	
two‐thirds	of	the	world’s	goods	and	services.		The	OECD	provides	a	
private	 setting	 for	 wealthy	 industrialized	 governments	 to	 share	
experiences,	 identify	 issues	 of	 common	 concern,	 and	 coordinate	
domestic	 and	 international	 policies.	 	 In	 simple	 terms,	 the	 OECD’s	
range	 of	 standing	 inter‐governmental	 committees	 serve	 as	 useful	
talking	shops	for	countries	to	share	experiences,	learning	from	one	
another’s	 successes	 and	 challenges.	 	While	 not	 voiced	 openly,	 the	
	
	 2.	 James	Salzman	&	Julio	Bacio	Terracino,	Labor	Rights,	Globalization	and	Institutions:	
The	Role	and	 Influence	 of	 the	Organisation	 for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development,	 in	
SOCIAL	ISSUES,	GLOBALISATION	AND	INTERNATIONAL	INSTITUTIONS	312,	313	(Virginia	A.	Leary	&	
Daniel	Warner	eds.,	2006)	(citations	omitted).	
	 3.	 Id.	at	316	(citations	omitted).	
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closed‐door	meetings	of	the	OECD	provide	an	important	alternative	
forum	to	what	is	often	viewed	as	the	developing	country‐dominated	
and	politicized	U.N.	system.	 	The	OECD	occupies	a	unique	position	
in	 the	 constellation	 of	 international	 organizations,	 with	
membership	broader	than	the	European	Union,	the	Nordic	Council,	
or	 the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	 (NAFTA),	 yet	much	
more	 restrictive	 than	 the	 United	 Nations	 or	WTO,	 and	with	 topic	
coverage	as	broad	as	any	international	organization.		As	a	result,	the	
OECD	provides	a	restricted	forum	on	virtually	unrestricted	topics.	
The	OECD	 also	 acts	 as	 a	 high‐powered	 research	 institution.	 	 Its	
more	than	2000	employees	(many	of	whom	are	economists)	collect	
data,	monitor	trends,	forecast	economic	developments,	and	develop	
policy	 options	 for	 consideration	 by	 member	 countries.	 	 Its	
Economic	 Outlook	 series,	 for	 example,	 forecasts	 macroeconomic	
trends	 over	 the	 next	 two	 years	 such	 as	 gross	 domestic	 product,	
employment,	account	balances,	and	interest	rates,	each	of	which	is	
followed	closely	by	the	global	financial	media.		The	OECD’s	ability	to	
gather	 and	 synthesize	 data	 on	 members’	 policy	 initiatives	 and	
results	 provides	 a	 wealth	 of	 insight	 concerning	 which	 types	 of	
policies	 work	 best	 in	 particular	 settings.	 	 Unlike	 sector‐specific	
intergovernmental		organizations	(IGOs)	such	as	the	United	Nations	
Environment	 Program	 (UNEP),	 the	 United	 Nations	 Food	 and	
Agriculture	Program,	 the	 International	Monetary	Organization	and	
others,	 the	OECD’s	research	occurs	in	virtually	all	 fields	of	 interest	
to	 governmentsincluding	 trade,	 environment,	 agriculture,	
technology,	 taxation,	 education,	 foreign	 assistance,	 and	
employment.	 	 The	 result	 is	 over	250	books	published	annually,	 in	
addition	to	many	reports	that	are	not	published.4	
Importantly,	 the	 OECD’s	 research	 is	 purposely	 conducted	 on	
behalf	of	member	country	government	officials,	who	direct	from	the	
outset	 the	scope	of	work	with	their	own	domestic	policy	and	 legal	
development	 concerns	 in	 mind.	 	 The	 research	 agendas	 can	 be	
strategic,	with	domestic	agency	officials	attempting	to	use	the	OECD	
as	 a	 fulcrum	 to	 leverage	 policies	 in	 their	 capitals.	 	 	 Such	
transgovernmental	 coalition	 building	 “takes	 place	when	 sub‐units	
build	coalitions	with	like‐minded	agencies	from	other	governments	
against	elements	of	their	own	administrative	structures.”5		Because	
its	organization	is	so	decentralized,	with	each	specialty	directorate’s	
work	 plan	 set	 by	 the	 respective	 national	 ministers	 (environment	
	
	 4.	 Id.	at	317–18	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).	
	 5.	 Id.	at	319	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).	
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ministers	 establishing	 the	 agenda	of	 the	Environment	Directorate,	
trade	ministers	determining	 the	projects	of	 the	Trade	Directorate,	
etc.),	 the	OECD	offers	enormous	 flexibility	and	speed	compared	 to	
other	international	institutions.	
In	 addition	 to	 its	 primary	 role	 of	 convening	 and	 research,	 the	
OECD	 has	 in	 a	 number	 of	 instances	 directed	 the	 negotiation	 and	
adoption	of	international	legal	instruments.		Article	5	of	the	OECD’s	
Convention	provides	for	member	countries,	through	the	Council	of	
Ministers,	 to	 take	 three	 types	 of	 legal	 actionrecommendations,	
decisions,	and	agreements	with	other	governmental	bodies.	
Recommendations	 are	 nonbinding	 agreements	 that	 generally	
represent	 policy	 advice	 with	 a	 strong	 base	 of	 support.6	 	 For	
example,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 information	
technology	 to	 create	 new	 avenues	 for	 offshore	 investment	 for	 the	
purposes	of	 tax	avoidance	and	evasion,	 the	OECD	Council	adopted	
two	recommendations	to	improve	exchange	of	information	between	
countries	 advocating	 the	 use	 of	 tax	 identification	 numbers	 and	 a	
standard	magnetic	 format	 for	automatic	exchange	of	 information.7		
Member	 countries	 generally	 use	 recommendations	 either	 as	 a	
means	 to	 influence	 domestic	 policy	 development,	 arguing	 in	 their	
respective	 capitals	 that	 the	 OECD	 has	 endorsed	 a	 particular	
approach,	or	as	a	precursor	to	a	decision.	
Decisions	 are	 legally	 binding	 on	 member	 countries.	 	 Not	
surprisingly,	adoption	of	decisions	is	less	frequent	than	adoption	of	
recommendations	 and	 the	 negotiations	 are	 followed	 much	 more	
closely	 by	 member	 countries.8	 	 In	 1972,	 for	 example,	 the	 OECD	
adopted	a	decision	confirming	the	 importance	of	 the	Polluter‐Pays	
Principle.9	 	The	Polluter‐Pays	principle	 is	“a	 fundamental	principle	
for	 allocating	 costs	 of	 pollution	 prevention	 and	 control	 measures	
introduced	 by	 the	 public	 authorities	 in	 Member	 countries,”	 that	
states	 that	 the	 polluter	 should	 bear	 the	 expenses	 of	 its	 impacts.10		
	
	 6.	 Id.	at	319	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).	
	 7.	 See	generally	Org.	 for	 Econ.	 Co‐operation	&	Dev.	 [OECD],	Recommendation	of	 the	
Council	of	the	OECD	on	the	Use	of	the	Revised	OECD	Standard	Magnetic	Format	for	Automatic	
Exchange	 of	 Information,	 OECD	 Doc.	 C(97)30/FINAL	 (July	 10,	 1997);	 OECD,	
Recommendation	of	the	Council	on	the	Use	of	Tax	Identification	Numbers	in	an	International	
Context,	OECD	Doc.	C(97)29/FINAL	(May	23,	1997).		
	 8.	 Salzman	&	Terracino,	supra	note	2,	at	321	(footnotes	omitted).	
	 9.	 See	 generally	 OECD,	 Recommendation	 of	 the	 Council	 on	 Guiding	 Principles	
Concerning	 International	Economic	Aspect	of	Environmental	Policies,	 OECD	Doc.	 C(72)128,	
Annex,	¶¶	1–5	(May	26,	1972)	[hereinafter	Guiding	Principles].	
	 10.	 OECD,	Recommendation	of	 the	Council	on	 the	 Implementation	of	 the	Polluter‐Pays	
Principle,	 OECD	Doc.	 C(74)(223),	 art.	 I	 (Nov.	 14,	 1974);	 see	also	Guiding	Principles,	 supra	
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Now	accepted	 in	 environmental	 economics	 as	 the	 straightforward	
requirement	 to	 internalize	 negative	 externalities,11	 the	 Polluter‐
Pays	 Principle	 was	 tremendously	 important	 in	 shaping	 early	
environmental	pollution	laws.	
Article	 6	 of	 the	 OECD	 Convention	 requires	 consensus	 for	
adoption	of	recommendations	and	decisions,	though	members	may	
abstain	 and	 thereby	 enter	 the	 equivalent	 of	 a	 reservation.	 	 The	
practice	 of	 closing	 meetings	 to	 the	 public	 and	 the	 consensus	
requirement	 for	 recommendations	 and	 decisions	 eliminates	much	
of	 the	 acrimony	 and	 political	 grandstanding	 in	 other	 fora	 such	 as	
the	U.N.	General	Assembly.	 	 If	proponents	of	a	recommendation	or	
decision	 face	 concerted	 opposition	 from	 even	 a	 few	 countries,	 a	
vote	will	not	be	 taken	until	 significant	negotiation	has	produced	a	
text	 acceptable	 to	 all	 the	member	 countries.	 	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	
decisions	are	binding,	 it	 is	exceedingly	rare	 for	any	OECD	decision	
to	provide	sanctions	for	noncompliance.	
While	 limited	 in	 number,	 the	 OECD’s	 drafting	 of	 international	
agreements	 has	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 crafting	 the	 emerging	
architecture	 of	 global	 governance.	 	 The	 agreements	 negotiated	 at	
the	 OECD,	 for	 example,	 reduce	 the	 importance	 of	 tax	 havens,	
prohibit	bribery	in	international	business	transactions,	regulate	the	
transfrontier	 movement	 of	 hazardous	 wastes,	 revise	 codes	 of	
conduct	for	corporate	governance,	and	create	multilateral	rules	for	
foreign	direct	investment.	 	In	all	of	these	cases,	the	agreements	set	
in	place	multilateral	rules	where	weak	or	nonexistent	international	
limits	operated	before.12	
The	next	Part	provides	a	series	of	case	studies,	providing	detailed	
examples	of	how	the	OECD	has	developed	international	law.	
I.		HAZARDOUS	WASTE	TRADE	
In	the	1980s,	a	high‐profile	series	of	 illegal	waste	dumping	riveted	
the	 public’s	 attention.	 	 The	 nature	 of	 these	 toxic	 shipments	 was	
fraudulently	 concealed	 from	 developing	 countries.	 	 The	 infamous	
Koko	case	in	1988	came	to	represent	one	of	the	worst	examples	of	
transboundary	 movements	 of	 hazardous	 waste.13	 	 In	 return	 for	
	
note	9,	¶¶	1–5.	
	 11.	 See	generally,	e.g.,	 OECD,	The	Polluter‐Pays	Principle	as	 It	Relates	 to	 International	
Trade,	OECD	Doc.	COM/ENV/TD(2001)44/FINAL	(Dec.	23,	2002).	
	 12.	 Salzman	&	Terracino,	supra	note	2,	at	322–23	(footnotes	omitted).	
	 13.	 For	 a	 case	 study	 of	 the	 Koko	 incident,	 see	 Alessandra	M.	 Poropot	 et	 al.,	Nigeria	
Waste	 Imports	 from	 Italy,	 TED	 CASE	 STUDIES	 (Jan.	 1993),	
http://www1.american.edu/ted/nigeria.htm.	
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paying	 $100	 monthly	 rent	 to	 a	 Nigerian	 national	 for	 use	 of	 his	
farmland,	five	ships	transported	18,000	barrels	of	Italian	hazardous	
waste	 to	 the	 small	 river	 town	 of	 Koko,	 Nigeria.14	 	 Some	 waste	
leached	 into	 the	 river,	 causing	 chemical	 burns	 and	 a	 number	 of	
deaths.15	 	 Italy	 was	 eventually	 forced,	 under	 the	 spotlight	 of	
international	media	attention	and	pressure	 from	Nigeria	(after	the	
Nigerian	 seizure	 of	 an	 unrelated	 Italian	 ship),	 to	 repackage	 the	
waste	 and	 send	 it	 back	 to	 Italy	 for	 appropriate	 disposal.16	 	 On	 its	
return	trip	to	Italy,	 the	ship	bearing	the	waste	was	refused	port	 in	
Spain,	 Denmark,	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 the	 United	 States.17	 	 As	 a	
result	 of	 this	 and	 similar	 scandals,	 Nigeria	 and	 Cameroon	 banned	
the	 importation	 of	 hazardous	 waste	 and	 instituted	 the	 death	
penalty	for	anyone	found	to	be	violating	the	ban.18	
This	 toxic	 waste	 trade	 was	 denounced	 by	 some	 as	 “Eco‐
Imperialism”	 and	 there	 were	 increasing	 calls	 by	 developing	
countries	 to	 halt	 the	waste	 trade	 entirely,19	 a	 commercial	 activity	
worth	millions	 of	 dollars.	 	 Action	 needed	 to	 be	 taken	 at	 both	 the	
domestic	 and	 international	 level.	 	 The	 difficulties	 faced	 by	 the	
United	 States	 in	 preventing	 shipments	 to	 countries	 with	 little	
capacity	 to	manage	and	dispose	of	waste,	and	the	problems	posed	
by	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 “hazardous	 waste”	 in	
European	countries	led	to	an	increasing	recognition	of	the	need	for	
an	international	framework	to	establish	universal	standards	for	the	
management	 and	 disposal	 of	 waste	 shipped	 across	 borders.	 	 Yet	
there	 was	 no	 meaningful	 international	 law	 in	 place.	 	 Spurred	 by	
national	and	regional	initiatives,	in	the	early	1980s	both	UNEP	and	
the	 OECD	 turned	 their	 focus	 to	 the	 management	 of	 hazardous	
wastes.	
The	 OECD	 promulgated	 the	 first	 international	 instrument	
	
	 14.	 Id.	pt.	A(1)‐(2).		
	 15.	 See	 id.	 pt.	 A(2)	 (discussing	 chemical	 burns	 and	 premature	 births	 caused	 by	 the	
waste);	Anthony	Akaeze,	Koko:	23	Years	after	the	Toxic	Waste	Dump,	NEWSWATCH	(Aug.	16,	
2010),	
http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2343&Ite
mid=42	(discussing	deaths	caused	by	the	waste).	
	 16.	 See	Poropot	et	al,	supra	note	13,	pts.	A(2),	B(5).	
	 17.	 Seaport	 Envtl.	 Sec.	Network,	 Int’l	Network	 for	 Envtl.	 Compliance	&	Enforcement,	
The	 International	 Hazardous	 Waste	 Trade	 Through	 Seaports	 2	 (Nov.	 24,	 2009),	
http://www.inece.org/seaport/SeaportWorkingPaper_24November.pdf	 (unnumbered	
working	paper).	
	 18.	 Charles	P.	Wallace,	Asia	Tires	of	Being	the	World’s	Toxic	Waste	Dumping	Ground,	L.A.	
TIMES,	Mar.	23,	1994,	at	A3.	
	 19.	 RICHARD	J.	LAZARUS,	THE	MAKING	OF	ENVIRONMENTAL	LAW	149	(2004).		
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regarding	the	international	movement	of	hazardous	waste	in	1984	
with	 its	Decision‐Recommendation	of	 the	Council	on	Transfrontier	
Movements	 of	 Hazardous	Waste,	mandating	OECD	member	 states	
to	 ensure	 that	 competent	 authorities	 of	 countries	 affected	 by	 the	
shipments	of	hazardous	waste	are	provided	“adequate	and	timely”	
information	on	its	movement.20		The	OECD	also	adopted	a	series	of	
far‐reaching,	 though	 nonbinding,	 recommendations.	 	 These	
included	 the	 principle	 that	 prior	 consent	 from	 the	 importing	 and	
transit	 states	 should	 be	 obtained	 for	 intra‐OECD	 shipments	 of	
waste;	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 exporter	 should	 provide	 detailed	
information	 to	 the	 importing	 country	 regarding	 the	origin,	nature,	
composition,	 and	 quantity	 of	 the	 waste	 to	 be	 shipped	 as	 well	 as	
environmental	risks	involved	in	transport;	and	the	obligation	of	the	
generator	 to	 dispose	 of	 the	 waste	 if	 an	 importer	 cannot	 safely	
dispose	of	it.21	
In	1986,	these	same	guidelines	were	extended	to	transboundary	
shipments	 of	 waste	 involving	 OECD	 members	 and	 nonmember	
states.22	 	The	1986	OECD	Decision‐Recommendation	of	the	Council	
on	Exports	of	Hazardous	Wastes	from	the	OECD	Area,	among	other	
things,	prohibited	both	the	export	of	hazardous	waste	to	non‐OECD	
countries	 without	 prior	 consent	 from	 the	 receiving	 country	 or	
notice	to	transit	nations,	and	the	export	of	hazardous	waste	to	non‐
OECD	states	that	lack	the	proper	disposal	facilities.23		Despite	these	
impressive	 initiatives,	 numerous	 problems	 accompanied	 the	
implementation	of	this	regulatory	regime.	
Spurred	 by	 high‐profile	 international	 incidents	 involving	 the	
shipment	 of	 hazardous	 wastes	 to	 developing	 countries,	 in	 1987	
UNEP’s	Governing	Council	adopted	the	Cairo	Guidelines.		The	Cairo	
Guidelines	were	a	nonbinding	agreement	on	environmentally	sound	
management	of	hazardous	waste.24		UNEP’s	Governing	Council	also	
	
	 20.	 OECD,	Decision‐Recommendation	 of	 the	 Council	 on	 the	Reduction	 of	 Transfrontier	
Movements	of	Hazardous	Waste,	art.	I,	OECD	Doc.	C(83)180/FINAL	(Feb.	1,	1984),	reprinted	
in	23	I.L.M.	214	(1984)	[hereinafter	Decision	on	Transfrontier	Waste	Movement].	
	 21.	 See	Principles	Concerning	Transfrontier	Movements	of	Hazardous	Waste,	¶¶	2,	3,	5,	
appended	to	Decision	on	Transfrontier	Waste	Movement,	supra	note	20.	
	 22.	 See	 generally	 OECD,	 Decision–Recommendation	 of	 the	 Council	 on	 Exports	 of	
Hazardous	 Wastes	 from	 the	 OECD	 Area,	 OECD	 Doc.	 C(86)64/FINAL	 (June	 5,	 1986)	
[hereinafter	Decision	on	Waste	Exports],	reprinted	in	25	I.L.M.	1010	(1986).	
	 23.	 See	 Measures	 Concerning	 the	 Control	 of	 Exports	 of	 Hazardous	 Wastes,	 ¶¶	 1,	
4(c)(ii),	appended	to	Decision	on	Waste	Exports,	supra	note	22;	see	also	OECD,	Decision	of	the	
Council	on	Transfrontier	Movements	of	Hazardous	Wastes,	OECD	Doc.	C(88)90/FINAL,	Annex	
(May	27,	1988),	as	reprinted	 in	28	 I.L.M.	257	(1989)	 (revising	 the	definition	of	hazardous	
waste).			
	 24.	 See	 United	 Nations	 Env’t	 Program,	 Cairo	 Guidelines	 and	 Principles	 for	 the	
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agreed	 to	 commence	 international	 negotiations	 on	 a	 binding	 legal	
instrument	governing	the	transboundary	movements	of	hazardous	
waste.25	 	 This	 draft	 was	 eventually	 negotiated	 into	 the	 Basel	
Convention,	which	was	concluded	on	March	22,	1989.26	
The	role	of	the	OECD’s	earlier	decision	and	recommendations	in	
influencing	UNEP	action	 is	noteworthy.	 	These	agreements	 served	
as	 a	 template	 for	 the	 Basel	 Convention	 negotiations.27	 	 It	 is	 no	
exaggeration	to	say	that	lawmaking	at	the	OECD	provided	both	the	
impetus	 and	 the	 foundation	 for	 more	 far‐reaching	 agreements	 in	
the	 United	 Nations.	 	 Indeed,	 article	 11	 of	 the	 Basel	 Convention	
provides	 an	 explicit	 exemption	 for	 trade	with	nonparties	who	 are	
members	of	comparable	agreements.28		This	has	allowed	the	United	
States	 to	 remain	 a	 nonparty	 and	 trade	 with	 other	 OECD	member	
states	through	the	OECD	decision	framework.	
II.		THE	BRIBERY	CONVENTION	
The	OECD’s	work	on	bribery	provides	a	similar	example	of	using	
recommendations	 and	 decisions	 to	 spur	 agreements	 in	 other	
international	fora.	 	 In	1975,	the	U.N.	General	Assembly	adopted	by	
consensus	 a	 resolution	 on	 “Measures	 against	 corrupt	 practices	 of	
transnational	 and	 other	 corporations,	 their	 intermediaries,	 and	
others	involved.”		This	led	four	years	later	to	a	draft	convention	on	
illicit	payments.		The	draft	convention	was	never	adopted,	however,	
because	 developing	 countries	 demanded	 adoption	 of	 stronger	
corporate	codes	as	a	precondition	for	their	support.		As	India	stated	
on	 behalf	 of	 the	 G77,	 “the	 UN	 Conference	 on	 an	 International	
Agreement	 on	 Illicit	 Payments	 [can]	 be	 convened	 only	 after	
completion	 of	 the	 UN	 Conference	 on	 a	 Code	 of	 Conduct	 on	
Transnational	 Corporation.”	 	 Developed	 countries,	 opposed	 the	
Code	 of	 Conduct	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 neither	 the	 code	 nor	 the	 draft	
convention	on	illicit	payments	was	adopted.	
	
Environmentally	Sound	Management	of	Hazardous	Wastes,	U.N.	Doc.	UNEP/WG.122/3	(Dec.	
10,	1985),	reprinted	in	8	UNITED	NATIONS	ENV’T	PROGRAM,	ENVIRONMENTAL	LAW	GUIDELINES	AND	
PRINCIPLES	 (1987);	 see	 also	 United	 Nations	 Env’t	 Program,	 Governing	 Council,	
Environmentally	 Sound	 Management	 of	 Hazardous	 Wastes,	 14th	 Sess.,	 U.N.	 Doc.	
UDEP/GC.14/30	(June	17,	1987)	(adopting	the	Cairo	Guidelines).	
	 25.	 Carol	 Annette	 Petsonk,	 The	 Role	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 Environment	 Programme	
(UNEP)	 in	 the	Development	of	 International	Environmental	Law,	 5	AM.	U.J.	 INT’L	 L.	&	 POL’Y	
351,	373–74	(1990).		
	 26.	 Basel	 Convention	 on	 the	 Control	 of	 Transboundary	 Movements	 of	 Hazardous	
Wastes	and	Their	Disposal,	Mar.	22,	1989,	1673	U.N.T.S.	57	[hereinafter	Basel	Convention].	
	 27.	 See	Petsonk,	supra	note	25,	at	374.	
	 28.	 Basel	Convention,	supra	note	26,	art.	11.	
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It	 took	 almost	 twenty	 years	 later	 for	 the	 OECD,	 without	
developing	 country	 opposition,	 to	 address	 the	 issue	 directly.		
Following	 extensive	 discussions	 amongst	 member	 countries,	 the	
OECD	 adopted	 recommendations	 in	 1994,	 1996,	 and	 1997	 on	
various	aspects	of	bribery,	calling	on	member	countries	to	combat	
international	 corruption	 by	 making	 bribery	 of	 foreign	 public	
officials	 a	 crime,	 preventing	 tax	 deductions	 for	 bribes,	 prohibiting	
corruption	 in	 contracts	 funded	 by	 development	 assistance	
programs,	and	creating	effective	company	rules	on	accounting	and	
auditing	 to	 reveal	 practices	 of	 bribery.	 	 In	 December,	 1997,	 the	
member	countries	and	 five	nonmembers	agreed	 to	a	decision	 that	
made	 binding	 the	 steps	 agreed	 to	 in	 previous	 recommendations.		
The	Convention	on	Combating	Bribery	provided	for	monitoring	by	
the	 Working	 Group	 on	 Bribery	 in	 International	 Business	
Transactions	to	ensure	full	implementation.	 	Soon	after,	the	United	
Nations	adopted	a	declaration	against	bribery	referring	to	the	OECD	
and	Organization	of	American	States	Conventions	and	passed	a	code	
of	conduct	for	public	officials.29	
III.		OECD	GUIDELINES	FOR	MULTINATIONAL	ENTERPRISES	
Following	revelations	 in	 the	early	1970s	of	wide‐scale	unethical	
and	 illegal	 activities	 by	 multinational	 companies,	 the	 United	
Nations,	 International	 Labor	 Organization,	 OECD,	 and	 national	
governments	 focused	on	means	 to	 influence	 their	behavior.	 	Much	
of	the	early	activity	centered	on	the	United	Nation’s	attempt	to	draft	
a	Code	of	Conduct	on	Transnational	Corporations.		The	U.N.	General	
Assembly	 adopted	 a	 consensus	 resolution	 on	 measures	 against	
corrupt	 transnational	 practices,	 but	 failed	 to	 follow	 up	 with	 a	
stronger	legal	instrument.		One	year	later,	in	1976	the	OECD	Council	
of	Ministers	adopted	a	recommendation	entitled	the	Declaration	on	
International	Investment	and	Multinational	Enterprises.	
As	its	name	suggests,	the	overriding	purpose	of	the	Declaration	is	
to	promote	transnational	investment.30		To	this	end,	the	Declaration	
called	 for	 member	 countries	 to	 respect	 national	 treatment	
(according	comparable	treatment	to	 foreign‐controlled	enterprises	
as	 accorded	 to	 domestic	 enterprises),	 minimize	 conflicting	
requirements	 on	 multinational	 enterprises	 (MNEs)	 by	 different	
governments,	and	make	transparent	incentives	and	disincentives	to	
	
	 29.	 Salzman	&	Terracino,	supra	note	2,	at	321–22	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).	
	 30.	 Id.	at	331–32	(footnotes	omitted).	
OECD	GW	ARTICLE	FINALSALZMAN_ARTICLE_EME.DOC	 3/1/2012		12:46	PM11:06	AM	
110	 The	Geo.	Wash.	Int’l	L.	Rev.	 [Vol.	43	
investment.31	 	 In	 its	 introduction	 and	 seven	 chapters,	 the	 original	
Guidelines	 for	 Multinational	 Enterprises	 (Guidelines)	 covered	 a	
wide	 breadth	 of	 issues	 governing	 investments.32	 	 The	 separate	
chapters	 range	 from	 such	 topics	 as	 information	 disclosure,	
competition,	and	financing	to	taxation,	science,	and	technology	but	
the	requirements	are	generally	vague	and	hortatory.	
One	of	its	chapters	set	forth	voluntary	rules	of	conduct	for	MNEs.		
These	 Guidelines	 were	 necessary	 to	 promote	 investment,	 it	 was	
argued,	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 misunderstandings	 and	 build	 an	
atmosphere	 of	 confidence	 and	 predictability	 between	 business,	
labor	 and	 governments.	 	 The	 Guidelines,	 it	 was	 hoped,	 would	
ensure	 that	 the	 operation	 of	 MNEs	 was	 compatible	 with	 the	
expectations	of	the	host	country	by	establishing	a	baseline	of	labor	
rights.33	
Implementation	 of	 the	 Guidelines	 commences	 at	 the	 national	
contact	 points	 within	 national	 governments.34	 	 National	 contact	
points	 serve	 as	 the	 initial	 stage	 of	 consideration	 for	 issues	 and	
conflicts	arising	under	the	Guidelines.	 	Any	party	who	believes	the	
Guidelines	have	been	violated	may	 request	 consultations	with	 the	
Contact	 Points.	 	 If	 the	 discussions	 at	 this	 level	 do	 not	 resolve	 the	
issue	between	the	parties,	it	can	be	passed	to	the	OECD’s	Committee	
on	International	Investment	and	Multinational	Enterprises	(CIME).		
CIME,	 located	 within	 the	 Directorate	 for	 Financial,	 Fiscal	 and	
Enterprise	 Affairs	 (DAFFE),	 is	 ultimately	 responsible	 for	
adjudication	 and	 development	 of	 the	 Guidelines.	 	 In	 response	 to	
disputes	passed	up	by	the	National	Contact	Points,	CIME	responds	
by	 clarifying	or	 interpreting	 specific	 language.	 	All	 CIME	decisions	
require	consensus	among	the	member	countries.	
Dispute	resolution	under	the	Guidelines	should	not	be	thought	of	
	
	 31.	 See	 generally	 ORG.	 ECON.	 CO‐OPERATION	 &	 DEV.,	 Declaration	 on	 International	
Investment	 and	 Multinational	 Enterprises,	 in	 DECLARATION	 BY	 THE	 GOVERNMENTS	 OF	 OECD	
MEMBER	 COUNTRIES	 AND	 DECISIONS	 OF	 THE	 OECD	 COUNCIL	 ON	 GUIDELINES	 FOR	MULTINATIONAL	
ENTERPRISES,	NATIONAL	TREATMENT,	INTERNATIONAL	INVESTMENT	INCENTIVES	AND	DISINCENTIVES,	
CONSULTATION	 PROCEDURES	 7	 (1976).	 	 The	 Declaration	 on	 International	 Investment	 and	
Multinational	Enterprises	was	updated	in	2000.		OECD,	The	OECD	Declaration	and	Decisions	
on	 International	 Investment	 and	 Multinational	 Enterprises:	 Basic	 Texts,	 OECD	 Doc.	
DAFFE/IME(2000)20	(Nov.	9,	2000).	
	 32.	 See	 generally	 ORG.	 ECON.	 CO‐OPERATION	 &	 DEV.,	 Guidelines	 for	 Multinational	
Enterprises,	in	DECLARATION	BY	THE	GOVERNMENTS	OF	OECD	MEMBER	COUNTRIES	AND	DECISIONS	
OF	 THE	OECD	COUNCIL	ON	GUIDELINES	 FOR	MULTINATIONAL	ENTERPRISES,	NATIONAL	TREATMENT,	
INTERNATIONAL	 INVESTMENT	 INCENTIVES	 AND	 DISINCENTIVES,	 CONSULTATION	 PROCEDURES	 7	
(1976).	
	 33.	 Salzman	&	Terracino,	supra	note	2,	at	332.	
	 34.	 Id.	at	335.	
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as	 a	 traditional	 judicial	 model,	 for	 CIME’s	 decisions	 have	 no	
retrospective	 applicability.	 	 Indeed	 since	 the	 Guidelines	 were	
adopted	 as	 recommendations,	 they	 cannot	 be	 treated	 as	 binding	
standards.		CIME’s	judgments	do	not	enforce	the	Guidelines	against	
either	 of	 the	 parties.	 	 Perhaps	 surprisingly,	 given	 the	 formality	 of	
the	 process,	 CIME	 makes	 a	 judgment	 on	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	
companies	 in	 question.	 	 Instead	 it	 uses	 the	 case	 to	 clarify	 the	
meaning	of	how	a	provision	in	the	Guidelines	should	be	applied	in	
future	 cases.	 	 In	 a	 legislative	 context,	 the	 closest	 analogy	 to	 this	
practice	would	be	if	the	U.S.	Congress	continued	creating	legislative	
history	after	its	passage	of	a	statute.		The	logic	behind	this	system	is	
similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	 common	 law’s	 clarification	 of	 doctrine	 in	
specific	 applications.	 	 Unlike	 the	 common	 law	 analogue,	 however,	
CIME	interpretations	are	never	binding	once	established.35	
Despite	critics,	 the	Guidelines’	are	widely	viewed	as	meaningful.		
Richard	 Rowan,	 a	 professor	 at	 the	 Wharton	 Business	 School,	
contends	 that	 the	 Guidelines	 provide	 useful	 mechanisms	 to	
influence	OECD	member	 countries	and	 their	 corporations	 through	
surveillance	and	peer	pressure.		The	Guidelines,	he	claims,	
have	been	used	by	the	international	union	movement	to	support	
broader	union	goals.		Publicity	pertaining	to	the	cases	has	led	to	
union	pressure	 for	 the	 establishment	of	 binding	 guidelines	 and	
legislation.	 	This	has	been	evident	 .	 .	 .	 in	the	pressure	placed	by	
the	 European	 Trade	 Union	 Confederation	 on	 the	 European	
Commission	for	the	passage	of	the	Vredeling	proposal.36	
In	a	later	book,	Rowan	argued	that	the	Guidelines	could	serve	the	
role	 of	 “enforced	 international	 regulation	 of	 multinationals”	
through	adverse	publicity.37		And,	in	fact,	there	are	several	examples	
of	this.38	
	
	 35.	 Id.	at	336.	
	 36.	 See	 Richard	 L.	 Rowan,	 Co‐director,	 Indus.	 Research	 Unit,	 Wharton	 Sch.,	 Univ.	 of	
Penn.,	 Remarks	 at	 the	 Kenneth	 M.	 Piper	 Lecture	 at	 the	 Chicago‐Kent	 College	 of	 Law:	
Transnational	 Regulation	 of	 the	 Labor	 Relations	 of	 Multinational	 Enterprises	 (Mar.	 31,	
1982),	in	58	CHI‐KENT	L.	REV.	909,	928	(1982).		The	Vredeling	proposal	requires	employers	
to	 provide	 information	 to	 and	 consult	 with	 local	 employees	 at	 least	 forty	 days	 prior	 to	
decisions	that	are	liable	to	have	a	substantial	effect	on	the	interests	of	employees,	including	
the	 rationale	 for	 the	 decision	 as	 well	 as	 the	 legal,	 economic,	 and	 social	 consequences	 to	
employees.		See	ROGER	BLANPAIN,	EUROPEAN	LABOUR	LAW	764	(12	ed.	2010).		
	 37.	 DUNCAN	C.	CAMPBELL	&	RICHARD	L.	ROWAN,	MULTINATIONAL	ENTERPRISES	AND	THE	OECD	
INDUSTRIAL	RELATIONS	GUIDELINES	7	(1983).	
	 38.	 See	id.	at	7–8	(discussing	challenges	brought	under	the	Guidelines).	 	Lance	Compa	
argues	that:	
In	the	1980s,	a	U.S.	union	facing	anti‐labor	conduct	by	the	local	management	
of	 a	 U.S.	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 Swedish	 Electrolux	 corporation	 used	 the	 OECD	
contact	 points	 system.	 	 Swedish	 unions	 pressured	 their	 government	 to	
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IV.		THE	MULTILATERAL	AGREEMENT	ON	INVESTMENT	
These	 three	 previous	 case	 studies	 have	 all	 suggested	 a	 clear	
pattern.		A	topic	of	major	concern	arises	on	the	international	stage,	
such	 as	 hazardous	 waste	 trade,	 bribery,	 or	 corporate	 conduct.		
Efforts	 within	 the	 United	 Nations	 or	 other	 international	
organizations	 to	 draft	 an	 agreement	 are	 unsuccessful.	 	 The	 OECD	
proceeds	on	its	own	and	provides	an	agreement	that	serves	as	the	
basis	 for	 future	negotiations	 in	 fora	with	wider	membership.	 	The	
keys	to	this	approach	are	opportunism	and	path	dependence.	 	The	
OECD	serves	as	an	advantageous	forum	to	host	negotiations,	in	part	
because	of	 its	significant	 technical	expertise,	 in	part	because	of	 its	
membership	 of	 like‐minded	 countries,	 and	 in	 part	 because	 of	 its	
closed	proceedings.	 	As	we	have	 seen,	 this	 can	be	 a	 very	 effective	
strategy	 to	 provide	 the	 tracks	 on	which	 the	 train	 of	 international	
agreements	 proceeds.	 	 But	 it	 does	not	 always	work.	 	 This	 is	most	
evident	 in	 the	 story	 of	 the	Multilateral	 Agreement	 on	 Investment	
(MAI).	
In	 the	 early	 1990s,	 the	 OECD’s	 CIME	 commenced	 a	 research	
project	 known	 as	 the	Wider	 Investment	 Instrument	 Project.	 	 The	
project	reflected	the	concern	among	member	countries	that	existing	
multilateral	instruments	governing	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	
had	 become	 inadequate	 in	 the	 face	 of	 unprecedented	 increases	 in	
investment.	 	 Flows	 of	 foreign	 capital	 to	 developing	 countries,	 for	
example,	 had	 increased	 ten‐fold	 from	 1982	 to	 1993	 and	 almost	
twenty‐fold	by	1996,	with	a	40%	increase	in	FDI	inflows	from	1994	
to	1995	alone.	 	Total	FDI	 exceeded	 the	value	of	 goods	 in	 trade	by	
more	 than	 five‐fold	yet,	 remarkably,	no	comprehensive	agreement	
existed	at	the	international	legal	governing	FDI.	
Absent	 a	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Tariffs	 and	 Trade	 (GATT)	 or	
other	 treaty,	 the	 international	 legal	 framework	 governing	 FDI	 has	
developed	 in	 a	 piecemeal,	 incremental	 approach	 through	 a	 broad	
network	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	(BITs).		BITs	both	establish	
and	clarify	the	rights	of	foreign	investors.	 	Mirroring	the	growth	of	
FDI,	the	number	of	BITs	has	dramatically	increased,	as	well.	 	From	
1989	to	1995,	more	BITs	were	negotiated	than	during	the	previous	
	
persuade	 Swedish	 parent	 company	managers	 to	 convince	U.S.	 executives	 to	
halt	 their	objectionable	 conduct.	 	 In	1990,	 the	United	Food	and	Commercial	
Workers	made	 a	 similar	move	 to	 the	 OECD	 in	 a	 dispute	with	 the	 Belgium‐
based	 Carrefour	 supermarket	 chain.	 	 International	 pressure	 that	 included	
solidarity	moves	by	Belgian	unions	brought	about	a	settlement	in	April	1991,	
by	which	the	company	recognized	the	union	and	entered	into	bargaining.	
Lance	Compa,	The	Multilateral	Agreement	on	 Investment	and	 International	Labor	Rights:	A	
Failed	Connection,	31	CORNELL	INT'L	L.J.	683,	690	(1998).	
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three	decades.	 	By	1995,	 over	900	BITs	had	been	 signed	between	
more	than	150	nations.	 	Through	its	Wider	Investment	Instrument	
Project,	 the	OECD	member	countries	 sought	 to	bring	order	 to	 this	
proliferation	 of	 FDI	 and	BITs,	 perhaps	 through	 an	 agreement	 that	
consolidated	 and	 harmonized	 the	 many	 BITsthrough	 a	
multilateral	agreement	on	investment.39	
During	the	Uruguay	Round,	a	number	of	countries	had	sought	to	
harmonize	 the	 patchwork	 of	 BITs	 through	 an	 MAI.	 	 The	 United	
States	and	others	proposed	a	comprehensive	investment	agreement	
but	 faced	 concerted	 opposition	 from	 developing	 countries.	 	 The	
ultimate	compromise,	the	Agreement	on	Trade‐Related	Investment	
Measures	 (TRIMs	 Agreement),	 addressed	 investment	 restrictions	
that	directly	 affect	 trade	 flows	 in	goods.	 	While	 it	 represented	 the	
first	 global	 agreement	 specifically	 directed	 at	 FDI	 since	 1947,	 the	
TRIMs	 Agreement’s	 narrow	 focus	 on	 investment	 measures	 that	
distort	 trade	 left	 the	most	 important	 investment	measures	outside	
the	agreement	and,	therefore,	outside	the	scope	of	the	WTO	dispute	
settlement	process.	 	Described	by	one	commentator	as	 “a	useful	 if	
somewhat	 meagre	 result	 of	 five	 years	 of	 tough	 negotiation,”	 the	
TRIMs	 Agreement	 was	 not	 viewed	 at	 the	 time	 as	 a	 significant	
achievement,	 largely	 re‐stating	 GATT	 law.	 	 Several	 other	 Uruguay	
Round	agreements,	most	notably	 the	General	Agreement	on	Trade	
in	 Services	 and	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Trade‐Related	 Aspects	 of	
Intellectual	Property	Rights,	created	disciplines	liberalizing	FDI	but	
these	 only	 represented	 first	 steps,	 failing	 to	 address	 the	 bulk	 of	
FDI.40	
Against	this	backdrop	of	failure,	following	the	completion	of	over	
seventy	preparatory	 studies,	 in	 1995	CIME	 and	 the	Committee	 on	
Capital	Movements	 and	 Invisible	 Transactions	 (CMIT)	 reported	 to	
the	OECD	Council	that	“the	foundations	have	now	been	laid	for	the	
successful	 negotiation	 of	 .	.	.	 [an	MAI]	 building	 on	OECD’s	 existing	
instruments	and	expertise.”		Based	on	this	advice,	the	OECD	Council	
decided	 to	move	 from	 research	 of	BITs	 to	 negotiation	 of	 the	MAI.		
The	 stated	goal	was	 to	 complete	 the	 treaty	by	May	1997.	 	A	high‐
level	 negotiating	 group	 was	 established	 outside	 the	 directorate	
structure,	 serviced	 by	 DAFFE	 (primarily	 from	 CIME)	 secretariat	
staff.	 	 They	 were	 given	 a	 mandate	 to	 create	 an	 agreement	 that	
would:	
provide	 a	 broad	 multinational	 framework	 for	 international	
	
	 39.	 Salzman	&	Terracino,	supra	note	2,	at	355	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).		
	 40.	 Id.	at	361–62	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).	
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investment	 with	 high	 standard	 for	 the	 liberalisation	 of	
investment	 regimes	 and	 investment	 protection	 and	 with	
effective	 dispute	 settlement	 procedures;	 be	 a	 free‐standing	
international	treaty	open	to	all	OECD	Members	and	the	European	
Communities,	and	to	accession	by	non‐OECD	Member	countries.		
Drafting	 groups	 and	 preparatory	 groups	 were	 established	 to	
address	 specific	 issues	 and	 flesh	 out	 areas	 of	 agreement	 before	
going	 to	 the	 main	 negotiating	 group	 in	 plenary	 session.	 	 All	 the	
member	 countries	 participated	 and	 within	 two	 years,	 eight	
nonmember	countries	had	joined	as	observers.	
From	 the	outset,	 the	MAI	negotiations	were	 regarded	 internally	
by	 the	 secretariat	 as	 a	 relatively	 straightforward	 technical	
harmonization	 exercise.	 	 Given	 that	 there	 was	 a	 great	 deal	 in	
common	among	the	many	investment	treaties,	it	was	expected	that	
the	OECD	secretariat	would	review	the	range	of	BIT	texts,	 identify	
common	 features,	 and	create	a	unifying	draft	 that	would	 form	 the	
basis	of	a	general	agreement.		The	MAI,	it	was	hoped,	would	be	the	
first	 comprehensive	 international	 investment	 treaty	 creating	
uniform	 rules	 for	 FDI	 protection,	 liberalization,	 and	 dispute	
settlement.	 	By	creating	a	more	 level	playing	field	than	the	bumpy	
terrain	 of	 BITs,	 the	 MAI	 would	 greatly	 reduce	 distortions	 to	
investment	 flows	 and	 therefore	 speed	 the	 growth	 of	 FDI,	
significantly	 promoting	 the	 liberalization	 of	 investment	 measures	
and	performance	 requirements	beyond	 the	 results	of	 the	Uruguay	
Round	agreements.		If	adopted,	the	MAI	would	supersede	the	OECD	
Codes	 and	 the	 Declaration,	 providing	 in	 their	 place	 an	 agreement	
with	substance	and	teeth.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 remember	 that	 the	 OECD	 was	 chosen	 as	 the	
negotiating	forum	for	the	MAI	by	the	member	countries,	not	by	the	
OECD	staff	itself.	 	When	controversy	erupted	over	the	negotiations	
in	1997,	selection	of	the	OECD	as	a	negotiating	forum	was	criticized	
as	a	dubious	choice,	at	best.		In	many	respects,	though,	this	was	an	
eminently	 reasonable	 decision,	 for	 the	 OECD	 seemingly	 offered	
three	 comparative	 institutional	 advantages	 over	 rival	 negotiating	
fora.	
First,	the	goal	of	the	negotiations	was	consistent	with	the	OECD’s	
founding	goal	of	liberalizing	trade	and	capital	flows.		The	OECD	had	
much	 greater	 in‐house	 expertise	 (in	 particular	 the	 DAFFE	
secretariat	 in	 CIME	 and	 CMIT)	 on	 international	 investment	 issues	
than	 the	 other	 relevant	 IGOs,	 particularly	 the	 trade‐focused	WTO	
and	 the	 United	 Nations	 Committee	 on	 Trade	 and	 Development	
(UNCTAD).	 	 This	 was	 the	 same	 organization,	 after	 all,	 that	 had	
drafted	 the	 Investment	 Codes	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 	 The	 secretariat	
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considered	the	undertaking	strictly	an	analytical	project	that	made	
use	of	the	OECD’s	substantial	institutional	knowledge.41	
Second,	the	OECD	had	a	successful	record	in	hosting	international	
negotiations.	 	 OECD	 recommendations	 and	 decisions	 are	 adopted	
every	 year,	 often	 involving	 intensive	 negotiation	 among	 member	
countries.	 	 During	 the	 same	 period	 as	 the	 Wider	 Investment	
Instrument	 Project,	 for	 example,	 the	 OECD	 successfully	 served	 as	
the	negotiating	forum	for	the	bribery	convention.	
Finally,	 and	 perhaps	 most	 important,	 the	 OECD’s	 restricted	
membership	 increased	 the	 likelihood	 of	 success.	 	 Aside	 from	 the	
newest	 members,	 all	 the	 OECD	 governments	 had	 worked	 closely	
together	in	the	past	for	the	purpose	of	liberalizing	investment	flows	
and	could	be	expected	to	favor	an	MAI.		After	all,	by	the	time	of	the	
MAI	 all	 the	 OECD	 member	 countries	 had	 removed	 exchange	
controls	 and	 further	 rolled	 back	 restrictions	 on	 inward	 FDI	 both	
through	 unilateral	 steps	 and	 as	 part	 of	 regional	 trade	 agreements	
within	the	European	Union	and	NAFTA.		OECD	members	accounted	
for	85%	of	all	FDI	outflows.		
It	also	seems	 likely	 that	 the	concerted	opposition	by	developing	
countries	 in	 the	WTO	provided	a	strong	 incentive	 to	negotiate	 the	
MAI	at	 the	OECD.	 	 If	 it	were	not	possible	to	gain	broad	developing	
country	 support	 for	 global	 investment	 rules,	 then	 negotiations	 at	
fora	with	inclusive	membership	such	as	the	WTO	or	UNCTAD	would	
prove	fruitless.		The	like‐mindedness	of	OECD	member	countries	is	
the	 raison	 d’être	 for	 the	 organization’s	 existence.	 	 Why	 not,	 then,	
commence	 MAI	 negotiations	 in	 a	 forum	 where	 success	 seemed	
more	 assured?	 	 The	 OECD	 Council’s	 decision	 to	 commence	
negotiations	 of	 the	 MAI	 came	 shortly	 after	 the	 Final	 Act	 of	 the	
Uruguay	Round.		The	shift	of	investment	negotiations	from	the	WTO	
to	the	OECD	certainly	suggests	a	causal	influence.42	
The	OECD	member	countries	appear	to	have	relied	on	a	“build	it	
and	 they	 will	 come”	 strategy	 of	 treaty	 development.	 	 From	 the	
outset,	it	was	expected	that	the	MAI	would	be	a	free‐standing	treaty	
open	 to	 accession	by	nonmember	countries	on	a	negotiated	basis.		
In	many	respects	this	was	no	different	than	the	history	of	the	GATT.		
The	original	contracting	parties	in	1947	surely	expected	that	other	
countries	 would	 accede	 to	 the	 treaty	 and	 adopt	 the	 GATT’s	
disciplines	as	the	benefits	of	liberalized	trade	become	clear.		Nor	did	
the	 Treaty	 of	 Rome	 and	 subsequent	 European	 Community	 and	
	
	 41.	 Id.	at	362–64	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).		
	 42.	 Id.	at	364–65	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).		
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European	 Union	 treaties	 dissuade	 hopeful	 applicants	 for	
membership	 despite	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 established	 laws	
must	 be	 accepted	 as	 a	 condition	 to	 accession.	 	 It	 was	 the	 explicit	
strategy	 of	 some	 of	 the	 member	 countries	 (and	 certainly	 of	 the	
European	Union)	to	use	the	result	of	OECD	negotiations	as	the	basis	
for	 an	 even	 broader	 WTO	 agreement	 on	 direct	 investment.	 	 The	
communiqué	from	the	1996	OECD	ministerial	meeting	declared	the	
member	 countries’	 “interest	 in	 beginning	 an	 examination	 of	 trade	
and	 investment	 in	 the	 WTO	 and	 working	 towards	 a	 consensus,	
perhaps	including	the	possibility	of	negotiations.”	43	
Moreover,	 despite	 the	 later	 assertions	 of	 MAI	 critics,	 MAI	
negotiations	were	never	concealed	as	a	covert	fact	or	held	in	secret.		
To	 the	 contrary,	 the	 activities	 were	 announced	 in	 OECD	 press	
releases,	articles	were	published	in	the	organization’s	magazine,	the	
OECD	Observer,	and	many	of	the	conference	papers	were	posted	on	
the	 OECD	 Internet	 website	 created	 for	 the	 MAI	 in	 June,	 1996.		
Indeed	 the	OECD	held	 an	 early	press	 conference	 to	discuss	 issues	
concerning	 negotiation	 of	 the	MAI	 and	 no	 one	 showed	 up.44	 	 In	 a	
matter	of	months,	though,	this	radically	changed.	
Indeed,	 the	 rapidity	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 nongovernmental	
organization	 (NGO)	 opposition	 to	 the	 MAI	 was	 unprecedented.		
From	the	end	of	1995,	a	small	number	of	NGOs	started	to	follow	the	
negotiations	 and	 oppose	 both	 the	 goals	 and	 content	 of	 the	 MAI	
process.		The	OECD	held	an	informal	meeting	with	interested	NGOs	
in	 December	 of	 1996.	 	 While	 the	 OECD	 was	 open	 in	 terms	 of	
announcing	the	process	of	the	negotiations	and	their	general	status,	
in	 keeping	 with	 OECD	 procedures	 the	 internal	 documents	 were	
restricted.	 	 In	 February,	 1997,	 however,	 the	 group	 Public	 Citizen,	
founded	 by	Ralph	Nader,	 got	 hold	 of	 the	 current	 chairman’s	 draft	
(i.e.	the	consolidated	negotiating	text	up	to	that	point)	and	posted	it	
on	the	Internet.	 	This	posting	provided	the	catalyst	for	widespread	
and	hard	line	opposition	of	NGOs	against	the	MAI.		Just	two	months	
later,	a	more	 formal	meeting	 for	NGOs	was	hosted	by	members	of	
the	 negotiating	 group	 and	 secretariat	 officials.	 	 While	 the	 OECD’s	
first	consultative	meeting	with	interested	groups	about	the	MAI	had	
been	in	an	empty	room,	the	October	briefing	attracted	over	seventy	
representatives	 from	 thirty	 groups	 around	 the	 world.	 	 In	 a	 mere	
matter	 of	 months,	 through	 the	 Internet	 and	 e‐mail	 a	 global	
campaign	against	the	MAI	had	come	into	being.		Drafts	and	bulletins	
	
	 43.	 Id.	at	366–67	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).	
	 44.	 Id.	at	368.	
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on	the	MAI	were	now	regularly	posted	on	a	host	of	NGO	websites.		
By	1998,	anti‐MAI	campaigns	were	active	 in	more	 than	half	of	 the	
OECD	countries	as	well	as	many	developing	countries.	45	
The	impact	of	a	global	NGO	campaign	against	the	MAI	was	quickly	
felt.		By	the	time	the	chairman’s	draft	was	issued	in	early	1998,	with	
the	 exception	 of	 mandated	 national	 contact	 points,	 many	 of	 the	
NGOs’	 demands	 had	 been	 met.	 	 Despite	 earlier	 protestations	 by	
some	member	countries,	text	was	inserted	to	prohibit	the	lowering	
of	social	and	environmental	standards	to	attract	FDI,	to	ensure	that	
treaty	 obligations	 would	 not	 prevent	 governments	 from	
maintaining	 (or	 heightening)	 protective	 social	 and	 environmental	
standards,	and	to	ban	claims	by	foreign	investors	for	compensation	
for	losses	caused	by	nondiscriminatory	regulatory	actions.	
These	concessions,	however,	came	too	late,	for	the	NGO	campaign	
had	taken	on	a	life	of	its	own	in	domestic	politics.46	 	In	this	setting	
the	 OECD’s	 lack	 of	 experience	 in	 managing	 highly	 contentious	
negotiations	 proved	 fatal.	 	 As	 the	 OECD’s	 secretary‐general	 later	
acknowledged,	 the	 OECD	 was	 badly	 outgunned	 in	 the	 world	 of	
public	 relations.	 	 The	 OECD’s	 reactions	 to	 growing	 NGO	
attacksmore	 press	 conferences	 and	 enhancing	 the	 MAI	 home‐
page	 on	 its	 websitehad	 the	 same	 effect	 as	 whistling	 into	 a	
storm.47	
In	 early	 1998,	 seeking	 to	 resurrect	 the	 chances	 of	 renewed	 fast	
track	 authority	 from	Congress,	 the	 Clinton	Administration	 curried	
favor	 with	 local	 constituencies	 by	 denouncing	 the	MAI	 as	 “fatally	
flawed”	 and	 demanding	 that	 it	 be	 reconsidered.	 	 Domestic	
opposition	 also	 flared	 up	 in	 Paris,	 where	 demonstrations	 in	
February	 took	 aim	at	 the	 impact	 of	 the	MAI	on	France’s	 ability	 to	
protect	its	cultural	heritage.		In	response,	the	MAI	negotiations	were	
formally	 suspended	 for	 six	months	 for	 a	 period	 of	 assessment	 by	
the	 negotiating	 parties.	 	 On	 October	 14,	 one	 week	 before	
negotiations	 were	 scheduled	 to	 resume,	 Prime	 Minister	 Jospin	 of	
France	 released	 an	 official	 statement	 in	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Deputies,	
declaring	 that	 since	 the	 MAI	 posed	 “fundamental	 problems	 with	
respect	 to	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 states”	 and	 was	 in	 its	 current	 state	
“unreformable,”	that	France	would	pull	out	of	the	negotiations.		One	
of	 the	 MAI’s	 strongest	 early	 proponents,	 France	 held	 out	 the	
possibility	 of	 resuming	 negotiations	 but	 only	 on	 “an	 entirely	 new	
	
	 45.	 Id.	at	376.		
	 46.	 Id.	at	378–80	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).	
	 47.	 Id.	at	377–78.	
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basis.”		Its	abandonment	of	negotiations	meant	the	European	Union	
had	 to	 follow,	 effectively	 dooming	 the	 OECD’s	 negotiation	 of	 an	
MAI.48	
With	 the	 MAI,	 the	 OECD’s	 model	 of	 negotiating	 a	 foundational	
agreement	among	its	members	and	then	using	that	as	the	basis	for	
further	negotiations	 in	other	 fora	 failed.	 	 It	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	
this	Article	to	go	into	the	substantive	reasons	for	the	MAI’s	demise	
but	 one	 point	 stands	 out.	 	 Both	 the	 OECD	 secretariat	 and	 the	
member	country	governments	clearly	underestimated	the	political	
sensitivity	and	implications	of	an	MAI.		They	thought	negotiation	of	
the	MAI	was	a	technical	exercise,	requiring	expertise	the	OECD	was	
uniquely	well	suited	to	provide.	 	As	a	result,	 the	country	delegates	
failed	 to	 ask	 for	 high‐level	 political	 support	 at	 the	 outset.		
Realization	 that	 the	 seemingly	 technical	 matters	 had	 significant	
political	implications	came	too	late	in	the	game.		In	retrospect,	too,	
it’s	clear	that	the	OECD	had	neither	the	capacity	nor	experience	to	
respond	to	a	concerted	NGO	campaign.		The	OECD	as	an	institution	
was	not	used	to	being	in	the	public	spotlight.49	
V.		CONDITIONAL	AGENDA	SETTING	
There	are	two	key	lessons	one	can	draw	from	these	case	studies	
about	the	OECD’s	role	in	international	law‐making.	 	The	first	is	the	
importance	of	what	might	be	termed	conditional	agenda	setting.		As	
mentioned	 above,	 Anne‐Marie	 Slaughter	 held	 out	 the	 OECD	 as	 a	
model	 for	 future	 international	 organizations.	 	 The	 basis	 for	 her	
prediction	 lies	 in	 the	 growth	 of	
transgovernmentalismcooperative	 problem‐solving	 by	 global	
networks	 of	 subparts	 of	 the	 state	 such	 as	 courts,	 agencies,	
legislatures,	 and	 executives.	 	 “These	 parts,”	 Slaughter	 argues,	 “are	
networking	with	their	counterparts	abroad,	creating	a	dense	web	of	
relations	 that	 constitutes	 a	 new,	 transgovernmental	 order.	 .	 .	 .	
[T]ransgovernmentalism	is	rapidly	becoming	the	most	widespread	
and	effective	mode	of	international	governance”	
As	 recognized	by	 Slaughter,	 though	often	overlooked,	 the	OECD	
exercises	 enormous	 influence	 simply	 through	 its	 organizational	
activities.50		Consider	that	the	OECD’s	committees,	working	groups,	
expert	 groups,	 and	 conferences	 bring	 together	 approximately	
40,000	government	officials	and	experts	annually.	 	 Inevitably,	 some	
	
	 48.	 Id.	at	380	(citations	omitted).	
	 49.	 Id.	at	382.	
	 50.	 Id.	at	386	(citations	omitted).	
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of	 these	 gatherings	 coalesce	 into	 a	 core	 of	 identifiable	 groups	 of	
experts	 that	 exercise	 influence	 over	 the	 delineation	 of	 policy	
challenges	 and	 strategic	 analysis	 of	 their	 resolution.51	 	 Beyond	
guiding	 and	 informing	 the	 secretariat’s	 activities,	 these	 repeated	
encounters	 can	 subtly	 (and	 sometimes	 not	 so	 subtly)	 guide	 the	
officials’	attitudes	and	activities,	as	well.	 	As	a	classic	 international	
relations	article	observed	over	twenty‐five	years	ago:	
When	 the	 same	 officials	 meet	 recurrently,	 they	 sometimes	
develop	a	sense	of	collegiality	which	may	be	reinforced	by	their	
membership	 in	 a	 common	 profession,	 such	 as	 economics,	
physics,	 or	 meteorology.	 	 Individual	 officials	 may	 even	 define	
their	 roles	 partly	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 transnational	 reference	
group	 rather	 than	 in	 purely	 national	 terms	 .	.	.	 Regularized	
patterns	 of	 policy	 coordination	 can	 therefore	 create	 attitudes	
and	 relationships	 that	will	 at	 least	marginally	 change	 policy	 or	
affect	its	implementation.	52	
Put	 simply,	 by	 providing	 a	 forum	 for	 government	 officials	 and	
nongovernmental	 experts	 to	 meet	 and	 share	 research	 and	
experiences	on	cutting	edge	policy	issues,	institutions	can	frame	the	
issues	 for	 future	 collective	 consideration,	 lay	 the	 groundwork	 for	
agreement	 and	 identify	 whose	 the	 influential	 voices	 in	 the	 policy	
debate	shall	be.	53	
Richard	Stewart	has	described	one	such	activity	of	coordination	
as	 “horizontal	 arrangements”	 of	 administrative	 law	 that	 “involve	
informal	 cooperation	 among	 national	 regulatory	 officials	 to	
coordinate	 policies	 and	 enforcement	 practices	 in	 areas	 such	 as	
antitrust,	 telecommunications,	 chemicals	 regulation,	 and	
transportation	 safety.”54	 	 This	 coordination,	 he	 writes,	 “helps	 to	
reduce	 barriers	 to	 trade	 and	 commerce	 created	 by	 differing	
national	 regulations	 and	 to	 address	 transnational	 regulatory	
problems	that	exceed	purely	domestic	capabilities.”55		These	actions	
operate	below	the	radar	screen	of	what	we	normally	consider	to	be	
	
	 51.	 Id.	at	388	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).	
	 52.	 Id.	at	386	(citations	omitted).	
	 53.	 Id.	at	387	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).	
	 54.	 Richard	B.	Stewart,	Essay,	Administrative	Law	In	The	Twenty‐first	Century,	78	N.Y.U.	
L.	REV.	437,	455	(2003).	
	 55.	 Id.		This	is	reinforced	by	the	observation	of	Krause	and	Nye	that	“[w]ith	the	growth	
of	 economic	 interdependence,	 more	 bureaucracies	 that	 were	 once	 considered	 domestic	
become	involved	in	international	affairs.		Many	bureaucracies	and	agencies	of	governments	
have	similar	interests.		In	some	cases,	the	similarity	of	interests	is	greater	across	national	lines	
than	 it	 is	with	competing	domestic	agencies	and	 interests.”	 	Lawrence	B.	Kraus	&	 Joseph	S.	
Nye,	Reflections	on	 the	Economics	and	Politics	of	 International	Economic	Organizations,	 29	
INT’L	ORGS.	323,	337	(1975)	(emphasis	added).	
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lawmaking	 activities	 but	 may	 significantly	 influence	 agency	
activities.		As	Stewart	notes,	a	horizontal	network	of	agency	officials	
may	 agree	 informally	 to	 a	 common	 regulatory	 policy	 that	 is	
subsequently	 implemented	 domestically	 by	 participating	 U.S.	
regulators	 through	 rulemaking	 or	 enforcement	 actions.	 	 While	
these	 domestic	 implementing	 decisions	 are	 subject	 to	 U.S.	
administrative	 law	 procedures	 and	 judicial	 review,	 the	
underlying	policy	was	adopted	 through	extranational	processes	
that	 are	 not.	 	Moreover,	 in	 some	 cases	 there	may	be	no	 formal	
domestic	 decision	 at	 all,	 but	 merely	 administrative	 exercise	 of	
discretion—for	 example,	 a	 decision	 not	 to	 enforce	 U.S.	
requirements	 against	 imported	 products	 because	 of	 a	 prior	
informal	 agreement	 on	 functional	 equivalence	 or	 mutual	
recognition	of	regulatory	standards.56	
VI.		NEGOTIATION	FORUM	SHOPPING	
The	second	lesson	one	can	draw	from	the	OECD’s	involvement	in	
international	 law‐making	 is	 the	 dynamic	 of	 negotiation	 forum	
shopping.		In	a	world	of	overlap	among	international	organizations,	
competition	 inevitably	 results	 as	 institutions	 maneuver	 for	 the	
scarce	attention	and	resources	of	sovereign	states.		Forum	shopping	
is	 an	 important	aspect	of	 litigation	 in	 the	United	States,	 as	parties	
seek	jurisdictions	most	favorable	to	their	position,	and	it	is	no	less	
important	in	the	international	community.		As	Krause	and	Nye	have	
observed:	
Too	 little	 attention	 is	 given	 to	 the	 political	 process	 by	 which	
agendas	 are	 set	 in	world	politics.	 	 The	 choice	 of	 organizational	
arena	 often	 has	 an	 important	 effect	 on	 setting	 the	 agenda.		
Moreover,	 the	 different	 jurisdictional	 scope	 and	 the	 differing	
composition	of	delegations	to	different	organizations	frequently	
result	in	quite	different	distributions	of	influence	and	outcomes.		
The	same	issue	may	come	out	quite	differently	in	the	GATT	than	
in	 UNCTAD.	 	 States	 try	 to	 steer	 issues	 to	 power	 arenas	 more	
favorable	to	their	preferred	outcomes.	
What	 does	 an	 international	 institution	 need	 to	 develop	 a	
meaningful	 agreement?	 	 It	 needs	 information,	 key	 players	 at	 the	
table,	and	a	formal	structure	to	hammer	out	differences.		The	OECD	
provides	all	three.		The	central	defining	feature	of	the	OECD,	though,	
is	 its	 membership.	 	 The	 term,	 “OECD	 nations”	 clearly	 conveys	
images	of	wealthy	industrialized	countries,	of	a	rich	man’s	club,	just	
as	 UNCTAD	 denotes	 images	 of	 developing	 countries	 with	 export‐
based	 economies.	 	 The	 importance	 of	 the	 OECD	 members’	 like‐
mindedness	 cannot	 be	 overestimated,	 nor	 can	 the	 organization’s	
	
	 56.	 Stewart,	supra	note	54,	at	456.	
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explicitly	 economic	 perspective	 on	policy	 issues.	 	While	 the	OECD	
may	be	chosen	to	work	on	an	issue	because	of	its	powerful	research	
capacity,	it	may	also	be	chosen	by	a	member	country	as	a	competing	
forum	to	other	 institutions	working	on	the	same	 issue.	 	The	OECD	
was	chosen	in	part	as	the	negotiating	forum	for	the	MAI	because	of	
its	 in‐house	 expertise,	 but	 its	members’	 commitment	 to	 economic	
liberalization	 was	 surely	 significant	 as	 well.	 	 Negotiations	 on	 the	
MAI	 commenced	 at	 the	 OECD	 only	 after	 earlier	 attempts	 to	
negotiate	an	MAI	at	 the	broader‐based	WTO	had	 failed.	 	 Similarly,	
negotiation	of	the	OECD	Guidelines	commenced	at	the	OECD	during	
the	same	period	that	efforts	to	develop	corporate	codes	of	conduct	
at	the	United	Nations	became	blocked.		The	same	could	be	said	for	
the	 Bribery	 Convention	 and	 Hazardous	Waste	 Trade.	 	 Continuing	
negotiation	 at	 the	 OECD	 ensured	 not	 only	 a	 greater	 likelihood	 of	
reaching	 a	 final	 agreement,	 but	 an	 agreement	 that	 promoted	
economic	liberalism.57	
The	“build	it	and	they	will	come”	strategy	of	negotiation	followed	
in	 the	 MAI,	 Basel	 Convention,	 and	 other	 examples	 cited	 in	 this	
Article,	 though,	 clearly	 shows	 that	 an	 expanded	membership	may	
not	be	necessary	to	set	the	agendas	of	other	institutions.		While	the	
OECD’s	 restricted	membership	 allows	 it	 to	 reach	 agreements	 that	
could	not	be	brokered	in	more	inclusive	fora,	once	such	agreements	
have	 been	 completed	 it	 provides	 the	 impetus	 and	 grounding	 for	
development	 of	 treaties	 and	 conventions	 at	 other	 IGOs.	 	 This	
strategy	 of	 reaching	 agreement	 at	 the	OECD	 and	 then	passing	 the	
adopted	 text	 to	 IGOs	 with	 broader	 membership	 is	 one	 of	
foundation‐laying,	 though	 it	 can	 equally	 be	 viewed	 as	 strategic	
preemption.58	
This	 ability	 to	 reach	 agreement	 on	 issues	 that	 international	
organizations	with	larger	membership	have	previously	been	unable	
to	address	meaningfully	has	been	a	unique	strength	of	the	OECD.59		
Much	 as	 a	 small	 negotiating	 committee	 exercises	 enormous	
influence	by	brokering	deals	that	are	then	passed	to	the	plenary	for	
further	 discussion	 and	 potential	 adoption,	 by	 brokering	 an	
agreement	 among	 its	 members	 and	 then	 offering	 it	 to	 outside	
parties	(either	with	no	chance	of	amendment,	as	in	the	MAI	case,	or	
for	 development	 of	 a	more	 comprehensive	 agreement	 as	with	 the	
Basel	Convention)	the	scope	of	possible	compromises	is	effectively	
	
	 57.	 Salzman	&	Terracino,	supra	note	2,	at	393–94	(citations	omitted).		
	 58.	 Id.	at	395.	
	 59.	 Id.	at	322.	
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set.60		This	strategy	relies	on	the	importance	of	path	dependence	in	
fixing	 the	 trajectory	 for	 future	development.	 	There	are,	of	 course,	
limits	 to	 such	 a	 strategy.	 	 The	 OECD’s	 ability	 to	 set	 agendas	 is	
substantially	 weakened	 if	 the	 member	 countries	 cannot	 agree	
amongst	 themselves,	 the	 competing	 institutions	 have	 the	 capacity	
to	 broker	 separate	 agreements,	 or	 there	 exist	 few	 incentives	 for	
other	countries	to	follow	the	OECD’s	lead.61	
By	 providing	 a	 forum	 for	 government	 officials	 and	
nongovernmental	 experts	 to	 meet	 and	 share	 research	 and	
experiences	on	cutting	edge	policy	 issues,	 the	OECD	can	frame	the	
issues	 for	 future	 collective	 consideration,	 lay	 the	 groundwork	 for	
agreement	 and	 identify	 whose	 the	 influential	 voices	 in	 the	 policy	
debate	shall	be.62	
	
	
	 60.	 Id.	at	396.		A	related	form	of	agenda‐setting	that	bears	mention	is	sheer	numbers.		
If	OECD	member	country	can	 form	a	common	position	(even	absent	a	 formal	agreement),	
they	represent	a	considerable	voting	bloc	in	other	international	organizations.	 	During	the	
author’s	time	at	the	OECD,	for	example,	the	Environment	Directorate	held	a	special	meeting	
of	 its	 Environment	 Committee	 to	 prepare	 for	 the	 U.N.	 Conference	 on	 Environment	 and	
Development.	 	While	 agreement	was	not	 reached	on	 a	number	of	 issues	 (particularly	 the	
Convention	 on	 Biological	 Diversity),	 this	 process	 developed	 a	 number	 of	 common	 policy	
positions	among	the	member	countries.		Id.	at	396	n.209.	
	 61.	 Id.	at	397.		
	 62.	 Id.	at	387	(citations	and	footnotes	omitted).		
